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Mistake under the Common European Sales Law
Ariel Porat

The Common European Sales Law (CESL) sets the conditions in which the mistaken
party is entitled to rescission and compensation from the other party. Some of the
CESL’s provisions, however, are inconsistent with efficiency.
First, under the CESL, as long as the mistake is essential, for the mistaken party to be
allowed to rescind the contract, it is sufficient that the other party caused the mistake.
From an efficiency perspective, however, causation is not enough to allow rescission
for mistake. Second, the CESL permits rescission when one party failed to disclose
information to the other party that would have revealed to the latter his essential
mistake and the former party knew or could be expected to have known the mistake. In
contrast, under efficiency, not all essential mistakes made by the one party that the
other party knew or could have known about constitute grounds for rescission. Third,
the CESL allows rescission for fraud, which includes non-disclosure of information.
The CESL provides a list of considerations that should be taken into account in
deciding whether a duty of disclosure arises. In contrast, under efficiency, there are
far more concrete guidelines for determining whether a duty of disclosure arises, and
in fact, under certain conditions, intentional (“fraudulent”) misrepresentations are
even permitted. Fourth, the CESL allows a contract to be rescinded when both parties
made the same essential mistake. Yet efficiency considerations entail that this should
not always be the case and that some mutual mistakes should not be grounds for
rescission.
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Introduction
People create contracts in order to increase their welfare. Ideally, the
positions of both parties to the contract after performance will be better than what
their positions would have been had there been no contract. This, however, is not
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always the case. Numerous contingencies can arise before or after contracting that
will affect the surplus the parties can derive from the contract. It is certainly not rare
for one party to be left worse off from the contract while the other party is better off.
This does not mean, of course, that the party who ended up worse-off made a mistake
that will allow him to rescind the contract. In fact, in most such cases, the worse-off
party, legally speaking, did not make a mistake: he simply took a risk that,
unfortunately for him, materialized.
But there are cases in which a mistake was made, and the question that arises
is whether the party made worse off is entitled to rescission or even compensation if
he suffered harm. Contract law distinguishes between at least four types of mistake
situations: unilateral mistake, mutual mistake, non-disclosure, and fraud. The
Common European Sales Law (CESL) differentiates between “Mistake” and “Fraud”
in two separate articles. Under their definitions in the Law, mistake includes both
unilateral mistake and mutual mistake, whereas fraud refers to both active
misrepresentation and non-disclosure. The CESL sets the conditions in which the
mistaken party is entitled to rescission and compensation from the other party. Some
of the CESL’s provisions, however, are inconsistent with efficiency. The aim of this
Essay is to point out those inconsistencies.
First, under the CESL, as long as the mistake is essential,1 for the mistaken
party to be allowed to rescind the contract, it is sufficient that the other party caused
the mistake.2 From an efficiency perspective, however, causation is not enough to
allow rescission for mistake.
Second, the CESL permits rescission when one party failed to disclose
information to the other party that would have revealed to the latter his essential
mistake and the former party knew or could be expected to have known the mistake.
The question of whether a duty of disclosure arises should be answered, according to
the CESL, by referring to principles of good faith and fair dealing. 3 Efficiency,

1
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I interpret Art. 48, sec. 1(a), to condition rescission on the essentiality of the mistake. According
to this section, a condition to rescission is that “the party, but for the mistake, would not have
concluded the contract or would have done so only on fundamentally different contract terms
and the other party knew or could be expected to have known this.”
Art. 48, sec. 1(b)(i). The CESL adds in Art. 48, sec. 2, “A party may not avoid a contract for
mistake if the risk of the mistake was assumed, or in the circumstances should be borne, by that
party.”
Art. 48, sec. 1(b)(iii) of the CESL allows rescission if the other party “knew or could be
expected to have known of the mistake and caused the contract to be concluded in mistake by
not pointing out the relevant information, provided that good faith and fair dealing would have
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however, sets different and much clearer conditions for rescission. In particular, under
efficiency, not all essential mistakes made by the one party that the other party knew
or could have known about constitute grounds for rescission. Independently of good
faith and fair dealing principles, a party to a contract should often be entitled to
withhold information from the other party concerning the latter’s mistakes.
Third, the CESL allows rescission for fraud, which includes non-disclosure of
information. The Law provides a list of considerations that should be taken into
account in deciding whether a duty of disclosure arises.4 Although this list does
include important considerations, some of them are vaguely formulated. Moreover,
the CESL allows rescission whenever one party fraudulently misrepresented to the
other party. In contrast, under efficiency, there are far more concrete guidelines for
determining whether a duty of disclosure arises, and in fact, under certain conditions,
intentional (“fraudulent”) misrepresentations are even permitted.
Fourth, the CESL allows a contract to be rescinded when both parties made
the same essential mistake.5 Yet efficiency considerations entail that this should not
always be the case and that some mutual mistakes should not be grounds for
rescission.
The Essay proceeds as follows. Part I analyzes the unilateral mistake and nondisclosure doctrines. Part II discusses the first three inconsistencies between
efficiency and the CESL described above, all of which relate to unilateral mistake,
non-disclosure, and fraud doctrines. Part III analyzes the mutual mistake doctrine and
explains why the CESL’s concept of the doctrine is incompatible with efficiency
considerations. The Conclusion wraps up the discussion.

I. An Economic Analysis of Unilateral Mistakes and Non-Disclosure
Consider the following two examples:
Example 1. Air and Noise Pollution. A sells his residential apartment to B
and fails to disclose to her information about the air and noise pollution
emanating from a nearby factory. A knows that B, who has not seen the
property before purchasing it, is unaware of the pollution and also that B

4
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required a party aware of the mistake to point it out.” Rescission, however, would not be
allowed if the mistake was assumed by the mistaken party or “in the circumstances should be
borne by him.” For Art. 48, sec. 2, see supra note 2.
Art. 49, sec. 3.
Art. 48, sec. 1(b)(iv).
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values clean air and quiet. Upon discovering the pollution, B wants to rescind
the contract. Is she entitled to do so?
Example 2. Mineral Deposits. A enters into a contract to purchase a tract of
land from B, after conducting an expensive investigation into the likelihood
of mineral deposits on the land. The results indicated very high chances of
finding minerals. A discloses nothing to B. The contract price for the land
does not reflect a high likelihood of mineral deposits. B now wants to rescind
the contract. Is she entitled to do so?
In both examples, A failed to disclose material information to B and that nondisclosure probably induced the creation of the contract. In both examples, A was
aware of the importance of the information to B, as well as of the fact that she lacked
this information. The two cases can be described as either unilateral mistake cases—
when one party (A) knew about the other party’s (B) mistake but failed to point it out
to her—or fraudulent non-disclosure cases—when the non-disclosure was intended by
one party (A) to induce the other (B) to make a mistake. Yet should the law treat these
cases alike?
From an efficiency perspective, the answer is no: in Example 1, rescission
should be allowed, but in Example 2, it should not. I will start by explaining why
there should be no duty of disclosure in Example 2. If, in that case, A has a duty to
disclose the results of his investigation to B, he might not conduct the investigation in
the first place because he will not be able to reap the entirety of its benefits. His
investigation, however, generates information that is socially beneficial or productive:
this information can enable the efficient use of the land and increase social welfare.
Therefore, in order to encourage A’s investigation, he should be allowed to withhold
its results from B.6
In fact, had the information from the investigation been negative (low
likelihood of finding minerals), A would not have entered into the contract with B,
thereby avoiding a possible loss. Even with a duty of disclosure, then, A has some
incentive to conduct an investigation. If he discovers that the land is of low value (low
likelihood of finding minerals) and decides not to purchase it, he may keep the
information to himself (in which case, there is no social value to the information) or
somehow sell it to B for a price. If, instead, he finds out that the land has a high value
(high likelihood of finding minerals) and wants to purchase it, he must disclose the
6

Kronman, "Mistake, Disclosure, Information, and the Law of Contracts", 7 J. LEGAL STUD.
(1978), 1.
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information to B and will derive no benefit from it. Thus, under a duty of disclosure,
from the outset, A has not much to profit from investigating the possibility of mineral
deposits on the land. To provide him with strong incentives to do so, A should be
allowed to reap all of its benefits, including the benefit of positive information (high
likelihood of finding minerals). This can be achieved only if A has no duty to disclose
the results of his investigation to B.
Example 1 is a completely different case. A acquired the information
regarding the air and noise pollution at no cost to him: he learnt about these defects
from simply living there. Therefore, a duty of disclosure would not affect the
production of information of this type: with or without a duty of disclosure, A would
acquire the information.7 At the same time, however, imposing a duty of disclosure on
A in this Example would ensure that both he and B increase their welfare if they enter
into the contract; non-disclosure might lead B to buy an apartment that she would not
have bought had she been aware of its flaws.
It may very well be the case, then, that at the end of the day, a duty of
disclosure in Example 1 would have mainly redistributive consequences: With
disclosure, B might not have bought the apartment or would have bought it at a lower
price. In the absence of disclosure however, she might have paid more than the
apartment’s value for her. Yet paying an excessive price does not mean that B must
live in the apartment after discovering its defects immediately after moving in; indeed,
she is free to resell the apartment, and while, at the end, she loses money, that loss
would be close to A’s gain from not disclosing the information to B. Still, the latter
scenario would entail some social costs—the resale contracting costs—which would
be saved if there were disclosure. Furthermore, disclosure in Example 1 could also
save B the costs of acquiring information: with no duty of disclosure, she would have
to incur costs to find out about possible defects in the apartment, whereas with a duty
of disclosure, she would be able to trust A and avoid those costs. Note that for A, the
costs of acquiring information regarding air and noise pollution are zero, while for B
they are positive.8
To be sure, in Example 2, as well, non-disclosure could entail costs for B to
acquire information about the land that would be saved were A subject to a duty of
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Id.
Note also, that hiding information from one another could be more attractive to the parties when
there is no duty of disclosure, while such hiding is often costly but has no social value.
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disclosure. Thus, it is quite possible that with no duty of disclosure in this case, both
A and B would conduct a costly investigation into the land’s worth, and moreover,
neither would be able to reap much benefit from their respective investigations since
the other party acquired the same information.9 A possible solution is to impose on B
(the seller), but not A (the buyer), a duty of disclosure.10 This would increase the
buyer’s incentive to carry out the investigation. But more importantly, only when the
seller discloses no information to the buyer will the buyer proceed with an
investigation since he will understand that the seller has not conducted any
investigation himself.
Furthermore, in Example 2, with no duty of disclosure, there is the risk that A
(the buyer) will invest excessively, from a social perspective, in acquiring the
information about the land, because the information could be partly distributive, and
not just productive. That would be the case, for example, if there is high likelihood
that the information about the land would transpire soon after the conclusion of the
contract, even without any investigation by the parties. Finally, non-disclosure could
result – exactly as in Example 1 – in inefficient allocation of resources: given the
information about the land, it may occur that the land is more valuable at B’s, rather
than A’s hands, while non-disclosure would result in A purchasing the land. This
latter point is further analyzed below.11
In Example 3, below, which is a variation on Example 1, the case for
disclosure is stronger, since even though, as in Example 1, the information is acquired
by A at no cost to him, it is mainly productive rather than redistributive.12
Example 3. Termites. A sells his residential apartment to B, without
disclosing to her that the apartment is infested with termites. A lived in the
apartment for five years prior to selling it and is aware of the termite
9

10

11
12

Cf. Shavell, Foundations of Economic Analysis of Law, (Cambridge, 2004), p. 333 & n.15.
(explaining that with no duty of disclosure, private incentives to acquire information will be
excessive, but with such a duty, incentives will be insufficient). See also Harrison, "Rethinking
Mistake and Nondisclosure in Contract Law", 17 GEO. MASON L. REV. (2010), 335 (discussing
the inefficiency that could result from non-disclosure of information even if costly acquired and
suggesting that allowing the party who acquired the information first only part of its benefit
could often be the efficient solution); Kull, "Unilateral Mistake: The Baseball Card Case", 70
WASH. ULQ. (1991), 78 (arguing that non-disclosure incentivizes both parties to engage in a
redundant search for the same information).
For the argument that the case for disclosure by the seller is typically stronger than the case for
disclosure by the buyer, see infra note 16 and accompanying text.
Infra text accompanying notes 17-18.
On the distinction between redistributive and productive information, see Cooter & Ulen, Law &
Economics, 5th ed. (Harlow, 2007), pp. 292-98. See also Shavell, supra note 9, at 334
(distinguishing between information that has social value (i.e., that is productive) and
information that has only private value (i.e., that is redistributive).

7
problem. He also knows that B is unaware of the termites. Assume that
anyone living in the apartment for a year or more would in any event
discover the infestation. B wants to rescind the contract. Is she entitled to do
so?
The reason why Example 3 presents a stronger case for disclosure than
Example 1 is that the information with respect to the termite infestation is valuable to
B not just in deciding whether to buy the apartment or what price to pay, but also in
terms of taking precautions and preventing more serious harm to the apartment if she
does buy it.13 If B buys the apartment without being aware of the termites, it will take
her a year to discover them, and in this year, additional harm will be caused. A duty of
disclosure for A would prevent this added harm.14
The question of whether the relevant information is redistributive or
productive in nature is a central consideration in setting disclosure duties, not only
when acquiring the information is costless for the non-mistaken party, as in Examples
1 (Air and Noise Pollution) and 3 (Termites), but even more so when it is costly.
Example 2 (Mineral Deposits) represents cases in which acquiring the information is
costly and the information is productive. The next example, below, illustrates cases in
which acquiring the information is costly but the information is redistributive.
Example 4. Permission to Mine for Minerals. A buys a tract of land from B,
after conducting an expensive investigation into the likelihood of zoning
authorities granting him a permit to mine the land for minerals. The
investigation results indicate that likelihood to be very high. A discloses
nothing to B. The contract sets a price for the land that does not reflect the
high chances of receiving a mining permit. B wants to rescind the contract. Is
she entitled to do so?
In contrast to Example 2, the information in this example is redistributive
rather than productive. If A bears no duty of disclosure, he will invest in acquiring the
information. From a social perspective, however, this investment is a waste of
resources, since it will not produce any social value. Or at least this is the case if we
assume that nothing productive could be done with the land in light of the information

13

14

Cf., Cooter & Ulen, supra note 12, pp. 297-98 (calling this type of information “safety
information”).
One can imagine a duty of disclosure arising after the contract has been concluded. See infra
note 18 and accompanying text. For a discussion of the termites case, see Posner, Economics
Analysis of Law, 8th ed. (New York, 2003), p. 111.
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in the interim between the acquisition of the information by A and the public release
of the information.15
The nature of the information, as either productive or redistributive, is thus a
critical factor in setting duties of disclosure. This does not mean that it always tips the
scales in the same direction: sometimes the productivity of the information justifies
not imposing a duty of disclosure (as in Example 2, Mineral Deposits), and sometimes
it works the other way around (as in Example 3, Termites). Thus, in Example 2, the
buyer who acquired the information can make productive use of it, whereas the seller
in Example 3 must transfer the information he acquired to the buyer so that the latter
can make productive use of it.16 This difference between the two cases creates no
dilemma as to how to reach the efficient solution. In Example 2, the information is
costly, and to incentivize its production, the beneficiary of the information must be the
party that produces it (A). Non-disclosure would retain the information with that
party, and at the same time would allow him to use it productively. In contrast, in
Example 3, the information is costless, and it will be produced regardless of the
identity of its beneficiary. Disclosure would therefore not affect the production of the
information, but at the same time would allow its productive use.
Things are not as simple if the information must be productively used by the
party who does not acquire it and the information is costly. Thus, assume that in
Example 3, it is costly for the seller to inspect the apartment for termites. On the one
hand, if he has a duty to disclose the information he acquires to the buyer, he might
refrain from inspecting the apartment so as to avoid the potential costs entailed by the
duty of disclosure if termites are found.17 On the other hand, in the absence of a duty
15

16

17

Otherwise, the information could have productive consequences. Perhaps, however, the zoning
authority would still have good reasons for not releasing the information to the public.
For the argument that the case for disclosure by the seller is typically stronger than the case for
disclosure by the buyer since “it is the buyer who typically can make socially valuable use of the
information,” see SHAVELL, supra note 9, at 333. Shavell also explains that the seller has
incentives to acquire information about the land even with a duty of disclosure, since if that
information is positive, he will be able to raise the price accordingly. Shavell, "Acquisition and
Disclosure of Information Prior to Sale", 25 RAND J. ECON. (1994), 20, 21. See also Wonnell,
"The Structure of a General Theory of Nondisclosure", 41 CASE W. RES. L. REV. (1991), 329,
343-44, 377 (arguing that efficiency requires the merger of information and resources and that
that should be one of the rationales of the law of non-disclosure).
Although he may find the apartment to be termite-free, and if he can prove this to the buyer, he
may get a higher price. Proving this to the buyer however could be hard, and therefore the seller
is well aware, that if he sells the apartment, with a duty of disclosure, knowing less is better than
knowing more. Furthermore, if the buyer assumes with high probability that the apartment is
termite-free, while the seller, who possesses more information about the apartment, knows that
that probability is in fact low, his willingness to investigate about the presence of termite, with a
duty of disclosure, would be clearly too low.
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of disclosure, the seller might still inspect for termites, and the information he
acquires might be productive. For example, the owner of an apartment who is still
undecided about selling his apartment, without a duty of disclosure, might inspect for
termites and, if he decides not to sell, will use the information he acquires to prevent
additional harm to his apartment. Yet bound by a duty of disclosure, the same owner
might prefer ignorance and avoid the risk of finding termites and the subsequent costs
of disclosing the information if he does decide to sell the apartment later on.
An innovative solution to the case when the information is productive to the
party who does not acquire it and that information is costly is to impose a duty of
disclosure on the party in possession of the information, but only after the contract
has been made or even performed. Thus, using the variation on Example 3, the seller
would be allowed to withhold from the buyer the information about the termite
infestation prior to contracting and, thereby get a better deal, but after contracting, he
would be obliged to disclose the information so that the buyer can use it and prevent
further harm to the apartment. Although at first glance, this solution may seem odd to
some readers, it could lead to efficient results in many cases.18

Let me summarize the discussion thus far with four propositions:
1. When information is redistributive and costless,19 it should be disclosed
(Example 1, Air and Noise Pollution). At the very least, disclosure saves the other
party’s costs of acquiring the information herself.
2. When information is redistributive and costly, it should be disclosed
(Example 4, Permission to Mine for Minerals). Disclosure discourages investments
that are socially wasteful.
3. When information is productive and costless, it should be disclosed if the
other party could make productive use of it (Example 3, Termites). Disclosure enables
the productive use of the information, as well as saving the other party’s costs of
acquiring the information herself.
4. (1) When information is productive and costly, it should not be disclosed if
the party who acquires it can make productive use of it (Example 2, Mineral
18

19

A duty of disclosure arises under the law mostly prior to contracting; it can also, however, arise
at some point during performance. See Porat, "Comparative Fault Defense in Contract Law",
107 MICH. L. REV. (2009), 1397, 1399-1400. Here, I make the argument that in some
circumstances, it could arise even after performance has been completed.
Here and elsewhere, “costless” means costless to the party who acquired the information.
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Deposits). Non-disclosure encourages the production of the information from the
outset. (2) If, however, only the other party can make productive use of the
information (as in the termites case, where inspection is costly), it is unclear whether a
duty of disclosure is better or worse than non-disclosure.
These are, of course, only general guidelines for setting a duty of disclosure.
First, there are cases where information is partly redistributive and partly productive,
as well as cases in which the information is costly but not excessively so. This, of
course, could change the analysis. Second, the guidelines are intended as a basis for
setting duties of disclosure in categories of cases and not for ad-hoc determinations in
each individual case according to its particular features. Otherwise, they would guide
contractual parties poorly on how to behave and inefficiently increase litigation costs.
Third, the analysis in this part of the Essay did not distinguish between unilateral
mistakes and non-disclosure, for the same analysis applies to both cases. I address this
distinction in the next part of the Essay.

II. Unilateral Mistakes and Non-Disclosure under the CESL
Article 48 of the CESL stipulates that given that the mistake is essential,20 the
mistaken party may rescind the contract if “the other party … caused the mistake.”21
The Article further provides that “[a] party may not avoid a contract for mistake if the
risk of the mistake was assumed, or in the circumstances should be borne, by that
party.”22 The latter provision applies to all situations in which there is a prima-facie
case for rescission due to mistake.
It emerged from the analysis in Part I that in some cases of mistake, even if
caused by the other party, rescission should not be allowed. Consider Example 2
(Mineral Deposits) again, but with a new twist (in italics):
Example 2A. Mineral Deposits—Causing the Mistake. A enters into a
contract to purchase a tract of land from B, without conducting an
investigation into the likelihood of mineral deposits on the land. A says to B
that he is certain that the chances of finding minerals are low. B believes that
A is basing this on information he has acquired and that A is being honest
with her. The contract price for the land does not reflect a high likelihood of
mineral deposits. Later on, it becomes apparent that there are mineral
deposits on the land. B now wants to rescind the contract. Is she entitled to
do so?
20
21
22

Supra note 1 and accompanying text.
Art. 48, sec. 1(b)(i).
Art. 48, sec. 2.
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In this Example, A caused B’s mistake. Should this, in itself, be reason to
allow rescission of the contract? Let’s assume first that A was expressing his sincere
and genuine opinion when he said to B that he was certain that the chances of finding
minerals on the land were low. A may have been negligent in expressing such an
opinion without knowing anything for certain, or he may have been non-negligent—
after all he may have some positive information regarding the likelihood of finding
minerals even without conducting an investigation. Literally speaking, however, in
either event, A caused B’s mistake. This is even more the case, if we assume that A
did not express a sincere opinion, that he was completely ignorant of the facts, and
that this “opinion” was intended as a means of reducing the price of the land he
sought to purchase. In these circumstances, should B be entitled to rescission? The
prima-facie answer under the CESL is yes, since A caused B’s mistake.
At first glance, the analysis in Part I of the essay also seems to point to an
affirmative answer: A acquired no information about the land (certainly not costly
information), and therefore there is no special reason to exempt him from a duty to
disclose to B the fact that he has no such (at least reliable) information. Thus,
Example 2A seems to be a case in which the information that A lacks any information
about the land is redistributive and costless (Proposition 1) and thus should be
disclosed. But this would be too hasty a conclusion. If the law were to impose on A a
duty of disclosure that he lacks information, his silence in any case would be
interpreted as indication that he has information that he prefers not to disclose. There
would then be no efficient incentives for A to acquire costly information to begin
with. Therefore, when the nature of the information about the land is of the type that
is often costly and better not to be disclosed (Proposition 4(1)), the lack of such
information should not be subject to a duty of disclosure.
Furthermore, even if one holds the view that the information that A has no
information about the land should be disclosed to B in principle, it is at least unclear
as to whether B should be allowed to rescind the contract when A innocently, or even
negligently, failed to comply with his disclosure duty.23 This is even more the case if

23

Under the Restatement (Second) of Contracts at § 153, in unilateral mistake cases, the mistaken
party is entitled to rescind the contract if the other party “had reason to know of the mistake or
his fault caused the mistake.” In addition, rescission is allowed when enforcement of the
contract would be unconscionable. In both cases, rescission would not be allowed if the
mistaken party “bear[s] the risk of the mistake under the rule stated in § 154.” Thus, under the
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B herself was negligent in making the mistake. Thus, when there is a mistake caused
by both A and B, and if that mistake would ideally be avoided by A’s disclosure, the
efficient allocation of the risk of the mistake between the two parties is a question that
should be dealt with separately from the question of whether A should have prevented
B’s mistake if he were actually aware of it. I return to this point in Part III of the
Essay.
In Example 2A, A did not really know whether the chances of finding
minerals were low or high, and he might also have been unaware of B’s relying on his
statement about the chances being low. In contrast, in Example 2B, also a variation on
Example 2, A clearly knows about B’s mistake regarding the likelihood of mineral
deposits on the land but intentionally refrains from correcting this crucial
misconception.
Example 2B. Mineral Deposits—Knowledge of the Other Party’s Mistake. A
enters into a contract to purchase a tract of land from B, after conducting an
expensive investigation into the likelihood of mineral deposits on the land.
The results indicated very high chances of finding minerals. A discloses
nothing to B. B says to A that she knows that the chances of finding minerals
to be very low. A says nothing. The contract price for the land does not reflect
a high likelihood of mineral deposits. B now wants to rescind the contract. Is
she entitled to do so?
In this Example, A did not cause B’s mistake; he just failed to correct it.
Nevertheless, under Article 48 of the CESL, B is entitled to rescind the contract if A
“knew or could be expected to have known of the mistake and caused the contract to
be concluded in mistake by not pointing out the relevant information, provided that
good faith and fair dealing would have required a party aware of the mistake to point
it out.”24
Under the CESL, then, Example 2B represents, prima facie, a case for
rescission. Efficiency, however, would mandate no rescission in such a case. If A
were under a duty to disclose B’s mistake, he would have inefficient incentives to
acquire costly and productive information. Indeed, the analysis in Part I pointed to
non-disclosure under the (implicit) assumption that A has no knowledge of B’s belief
or perceptions regarding the chances of finding minerals on the land, but the

24

Restatement, causing the mistaken party’s mistake without fault will not entitle her to rescind
the contract.
Art. 48, sec. 1(b)(iii). Rescission, however, would not be allowed here either if the mistake was
assumed by the mistaken party or “in the circumstances should be borne by him.” See supra text
accompanying note 22.
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relaxation of this assumption does not change either the analysis or its outcomes.
Thus, if in (the original) Example 2, A bears no duty of disclosure because B says
nothing about the chances of finding minerals, but in Example 2B, he does have such
a duty because the issue was clearly raised by B, A would probably avoid acquiring
costly information in the first place since he would understand that he has low
chances of being able to reap its benefits in their entirety. Indeed, his ability to reap
the full benefit of the costly information would be a matter of pure coincidence: it
would depend on whether the issue was somehow raised by B or not.
Things become more complex in the circumstances of a third variation on
Example 2, where B straightforwardly inquires about the results of B’s investigation.
Example 2C. Mineral Deposits—Lying. A enters into a contract to purchase a
tract of land from B, after conducting an expensive investigation into the
likelihood of mineral deposits on the land. The results indicated very high
chances of finding minerals. A discloses nothing to B. B says to A that she
knows that A conducted an investigation and wants to know whether the
results showed a high likelihood of finding minerals. A responds that the
results indicated the chances to be low. The contract price for the land does
not reflect a high likelihood of mineral deposits. B now wants to rescind the
contract. Is she entitled to do so?
In Example 2C, A lied. By lying, he caused B’s mistake as in Example 2A,
and he was also aware of B’s mistake as in Example 2B. But more importantly, A’s
behavior also falls under the CESL definition of fraud in Article 49: “A party may
avoid a contract if the other party has induced the conclusion of the contract by
fraudulent misrepresentation … or fraudulent non-disclosure of any information
which good faith and fair dealing, or any precontractual information duty, required
that party to disclose.”25 The Article clarifies that “[n]on-disclosure is fraudulent if it
is intended to induce the person from whom the information is withheld to make a
mistake,”26 adding that “[i]n determining whether good faith and fair dealing require a
party to disclose particular information, regard should be had to all the
circumstances.”27 Typical circumstances are listed in Article 49, but all are related to
non-disclosure that constitutes fraud.28 Thus, as it becomes apparent from the wording

25
26
27
28

Art. 49, sec. 1.
Art. 49, sec. 2.
Art. 49, sec. 3.
These circumstances include: “(a) whether the party had special expertise; (b) the cost to the
party of acquiring the relevant information; (c) the ease with which the other party could have
acquired the information by other means; (d) the nature of the information; (e) the apparent
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of the CESL, when A lies to B—and does not simply fail to disclose information to
her—his behavior will be considered “fraudulent misrepresentation,” and B will be
entitled to rescission.
Does efficiency require that A be allowed to lie to B in Example 2C without
being exposed to the risk of rescission? The somewhat surprising answer is yes. 29 For
if not, A’s investment in acquiring the costly information would be inefficient. In
particular, A would not tend to take the risk of acquiring the information and later
reveal its contents to B just because B explicitly asked about it. Thus, from an
efficiency perspective, non-disclosure when A did not know (or was not expected to
know) about B’s mistake, non-disclosure when A knew (or was expected to know)
about B’s mistake, and lying about the contents of the information should have a
similar outcome so long as the information A acquired is costly and of productive use
to A (Proposition 4(1)).30
Interestingly, all legal systems apparently prohibit inducing contract by lying,
which is considered to be fraud. The question, then, is whether the gap can be bridged
between the efficiency argument and the prevailing approach of the law, which is
supported by conventional fairness intuitions. Indeed, even the efficiency argument
for lying is not “clean”: A’s lying to B in Example 2C may prevent B from
conducting an independent investigation into the potential of mineral deposits on her
land. On the one hand, preventing such an investigation could be efficient, since if B
were to conduct it herself, the information she would acquire would be mostly
redistributional rather than productive; therefore, from a social perspective, an
investigation by B would be a waste. On the other hand, the investigation results
could convince B that it is better for her not to sell the land because she is in a better

29

30

importance of the information to the other party; and (f) in contracts between traders, good
commercial practice in the situation concerned.” Art. 49, sec. 3.
See Levmore, "Securities and Secrets: Insider Trading and the Law of Contracts", 68 VA. L.
REV. (1982), 139-40, who has argued for an “optimal dishonesty” rule that would allow lies in
cases analogical to Example 2C. See also Sherwin, "Nonmaterial Misrepresentation: Damages,
Rescission, and the Possibility of Efficient Fraud", 36 LOY. LA. L. REV. (2003), 1023-4
(arguing that low level fraud should not result in markedly inefficient exchanges, and it may
help overcoming bargaining impasses); Borden, "Mistake and Disclosure in a Model of TwoSided Information Inputs", 73 Mo. L. Rev. (2008), 667 (discussing both Kronman’s and
Levmore’s arguments and proposing a rule which requires minimal truthful disclosure in
response to generalized questions from sellers).
In most of the law and economics literature, fraud is considered to be inefficient. See, e.g
Shavell., supra note 9, pp. 329-30, 334-35; Cooter & Ulen supra note 12, pp. 298-99. In the
typical cases of fraud analyzed in the law and economics literature, however, the information is
redistributive rather than productive. See, e.g., Posner, supra note 14, pp. 111, 113. But see
Levmore, supra note 29, pp. 139-40 (arguing that dishonesty could be efficient).
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position than the buyer to utilize it; in such case, the information would have social,
not just private, value. Indeed, once B realizes that lying is allowed, she would
distrust A’s statements about the low likelihood of finding minerals on the land and
would proceed as though she has no information about the land’s potential. But a
more plausible assumption is that lying—as opposed to mere non-disclosure—
increases the chances of B’s being misled by A after all, especially if A is allowed not
just to make false statements but also to “support” them with deceptive evidence.
Is there a way out of this loop? Ideally, A would simply say to B that he
refuses to answer her question about the land’s mineral potential, and B would
interpret this answer as “no information.” But as it should be clear by now, such an
answer would signal to B the high potential of finding minerals on the land, so it does
not solve the problem. A theoretical solution is that the law would prohibit disclosure
in cases represented by Example 2C. A would then be able to respond to B’s request
for information about the land that he is barred by law from providing any such
information, and B would not draw any conclusions from the statement (this legal
solution makes more sense when disclosure could affect identified third parties or
when A is a public authority31). More practically, if, but only if, A is a repeat player—
for example, a large corporation acquiring land across the country—A might adopt a
policy, known to all potential sellers, that it does not reveal any information about
land it is seeking to purchase. Such a policy could be beneficial to A, and once B
becomes aware of it, she would not take an explicit refusal on the part of A to answer
questions about the land as indication of its qualities.32
In other cases, prohibiting lying is clearly efficient. As we saw in Part I, there
are plenty of cases in which it is better to incentivize the party who acquired the
information to disclose it to the other party. In all such cases, it could make a
difference if the non-mistaken party failed either innocently, negligently, or
fraudulently to disclose the information that ideally should have been conveyed to the
mistaken party. I revisit this issue in the next part of the Essay.

31

32

Public officials would be taken more seriously by the other party to the contract if they state that
they are not allowed by law to reveal the relevant information. Note that the public authority
would typically be a repeat player, see infra text accompanying note 32.
The mere decision to purchase the land has a certain signaling effect, but there seems to be no
way to avoid this.
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III. Mutual Mistakes
A. Economic Analysis
In cases of mutual mistake, both parties make the same mistake. In the wellknown Sherwood v. Walker case,33 for example, a seller sold a cow to a buyer for $80,
believing it to be barren, when in fact, the cow was pregnant and worth about ten
times the agreed-upon price. The court allowed the seller to avoid the contract
because of the parties’ mutual mistake.
Mutual mistakes are analogical to tortuous accidents, and a similar logic
applies to them.34 With mutual mistakes, the main efficiency consideration is how to
incentivize the parties to efficiently avoid those mistakes (or insure against them).
Four main scenarios of mutual mistake can be described: in two of the scenarios,
either A or B is the cheapest cost-avoider of the mistake (i.e., either one of them is
negligent), in a third scenario, both A and B are the cheapest cost avoiders (i.e., both
are negligent35), and in a fourth scenario, neither of the parties is the cheapest cost
avoider (i.e., neither is negligent). If a contract is concluded by mutual mistake and,
before any reliance occurs, one of the parties wants to avoid the contract, letting him
rescind should not raise much objections, regardless of which party is the cheapest
cost avoider. Not permitting rescission would result in a windfall for the one party and
a loss to the other, with no clear social gain.36 Specifically, with mutual mistakes there
is often a risk that the trade between the parties did not create a social gain: the one
party’s gain did not necessarily exceed the other party’s loss.37 Furthermore,
rescinding the contract would lead to an assignment of rights that symmetrically
33
34

35

36

37

Sherwood v. Walker, [1887], 33 N.W. 919.
See generally Cohen, "How Fault Shapes Contract Law", in Ben Shahar & Porat (eds.), Fault in
American Contract Law (Cambridge, New York, 2010), p.53.
It is often the case that the parties can take precautions that are alternatives to one another, and
efficiency-wise, it is preferable that only one of them take precautions to prevent the mistake. In
such cases, it could be argued, only one party is the cheapest cost avoider, and he alone should
be considered negligent. In other cases, however, just as in accidental tort cases, precautions are
not alternative to one another, but complementary in nature, in the sense that efficiency-wise, it
is preferable that both parties take precautions to prevent the mistake. In such situations, just as
in the tort counterpart situations, if a mistake occurs, it could be the result of negligence on the
part of both parties.
For a critical account of the traditional economic analysis of the law of mutual mistakes and for
the argument that the parties to a contract would not like one of them to enjoy a windfall while
the other suffers loss, see Procaccia, "Revisiting the Economic Theory of Mutual Mistake and
Unforeseen Contingencies in Contract Law", (2012) (on file with author).
See Rasmusen & Ayres, "Mutual and Unilateral Mistake in Contract Law", 22 J. LEGAL STUD.
(1993), 325. Rasmusen and Ayres justify the decision in Sherwood v. Walker, [1887], 33 N.W.
919, supra note 33.
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informed parties would have agreed upon but for the mistake.38 Thus, in cases like
Sherwood v. Walker, assuming no reliance (and that the seller did not assume the risk
of the mistake), rescission makes economic sense.39 Finally, with mutual mistakes, the
consideration of incentivizing parties to invest in acquiring productive information by
upholding the contract—as with some unilateral mistakes—lose force, since it is
assumed that the parties simply failed to acquire any information.40
Things become trickier when one party wants to avoid the contract but the
other party relied on the contract, so that rescission would leave the latter with loss. In
such cases, if the contract is rescinded, efficiency would require that the loss be
allocated to the cheapest cost avoider (the negligent party).41 Alternatively, rescission
should not be allowed if the party seeking to rescind the contract is the cheapest cost
avoider. There could be intermediate cases, where both parties are the cheapest cost
avoiders or neither is the cheapest cost avoider, and then the question of whether to
allow rescission is more challenging. A possible solution is to allow rescission in such
cases but split the loss between the parties according to their relative fault (if they
both were the cheapest cost avoiders)42 or to leave each party with his own losses.
Note that even in the absence of proven reliance, it could still be argued that
rescission should not be allowed if the party who wants to rescind the contract is the
cheapest cost avoider. This argument could be compelling if we assume that even
with no proven reliance by the party opposing the rescission, he might suffer some
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39

40

41

42

See Smith & Smith, "Contract Law, Mutual Mistake, and Incentives to Produce and Disclose
Information", 19 J. LEGAL STUD. (1990), 477: “The mutual mistake doctrine leads to an
assignment of rights that is fully consistent with the contract terms that would have been agreed
to had it occurred to the transacting parties to include a warranty-like provision.” The authors
also support the current doctrine in its effect on the parties’ incentives to reveal their private
information, thereby preventing mutual mistakes, as well as their incentives to produce
information to begin with. Id.
Cf. Cooter & Ulen, supra note 12, pp. 291-92. Things would be different if the mistake was
assumed by the parties, but here I assume it was not.
The fact that the contract could be avoided could provide parties with incentives to take
precautions to avoid mutual mistakes, which could be either efficient or not. See Smith & Smith,
supra note 38.
Or the cheapest insurer. See Posner & Rosenfield, "Impossibility and Related Doctrines in
Contract Law: An Economic Analysis", 6 J. LEGAL STUD. (1977), 83; Cooter & Ulen, supra
note 12, pp. 291-92. For a critical account of Posner’s and Rosenfield’s arguments, see Smith &
Smith, supra note 38, pp. 487-88. The authors argue that it is often difficult to determine who
the cheapest cost avoider is, and in particular, courts are often unable “to distinguish cases of
true mutual mistake from those involving asymmetrically held information”. Id., p. 487. The
authors support the current doctrine, which generally allows rescission in mutual mistake cases,
see supra note 38.
Cf. Porat, supra note 18.
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loss after all.43 However, it would still be dubious – mainly for a non-efficiency
considerations – whether the mere possibility of suffering loss if rescission is granted
warrants letting one party enjoy a clear windfall that he did not bargain for just
because the other party should have discovered the mistake before the contract was
concluded.
B. The CESL
Under the CESL, in mutual mistake cases, the party who was adversely
affected by the mistake is entitled to rescind the contract. 44 As with unilateral mistake,
the CESL provides regarding mutual mistake as well that “[a] party may not avoid a
contract for mistake if the risk of the mistake was assumed, or in the circumstances
should be borne, by that party.”45 The CESL also allows damages to the rescinding
party: “A party who has the right to avoid a contract … is entitled … to damages from
the other party for loss suffered as a result of the mistake … provided that the other
party knew or could be expected to have known of the relevant circumstances.”46
The law of mutual mistake under the CESL is inefficient in several respects.
First, it allows rescission even if there is reliance, without taking into consideration
who is the cheapest cost avoider. Second, it imposes liability for loss suffered by the
rescinding party even if she is the cheapest cost avoider and does not allow liability
for any loss suffered by the other party. In contrast, under efficiency, when rescission
would end up in losses, the question of both whether to allow rescission and who
should bear the losses should be resolved according to the cheapest cost avoider
criterion.
The following example, which is a variation of the Sherwood v. Walker case,
illustrates the divergence between the CESL and the efficiency solutions to situations
of mutual mistake.
Example 5. The Cow. B sells her cow to A for $80, with both A and B
assuming the cow to be barren. In fact, however, the cow is pregnant and
worth $800. A spent $20 to transport the cow. B spent $10 preparing the cow
for delivery. B could have checked the cow a day prior to delivering her at a
very low cost and verified whether she is barren. B wants to rescind the
contract. Is she entitled to do so?
43

44
45
46

He may have lost opportunities, which is hard to prove. See Fuller & Perdue, "The Reliance
Interest in Contract Damages: 1", 46 YALE L.J. (1936), 52.
Art. 48, sec. 1(b)(iv).
Art. 48, sec. 2.
Art. 55.
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Under the CESL, B is prima facie entitled to rescind the contract. Moreover,
B could recover $10 for her expenses if A “could be expected to have known of the
relevant circumstances,” whereas A cannot recover $20 for his expenses. As noted,
the CESL stipulates that “[a] party may not avoid a contract for mistake if the risk of
the mistake was assumed, or in the circumstances should be borne, by that party.”47
Although in Example 5, the risk of the mistake was not assumed, the argument could
easily be made that the risk “should be borne” by B, who was at fault.
What is mandated by efficiency is quite clear in the circumstances of
Example 5. B is the cheapest cost avoider of the mistake: she was negligent in not
discovering the mistake before concluding the contract and, therefore, should be held
responsible for the outcome. One possible solution could be for B to simply be barred
from rescinding the contract. Alternatively, she could be entitled to rescind but
required to cover A’s losses. It seems that both solutions would provide incentives to
sellers like B to take precautions in order to avoid mistakes, including cases in which
the same mistake is made by both parties. Yet the first solution, however, could be
problematic: if B is not allowed to rescind the contract, she will have no reason to
disclose to A the information she acquires after the creation of the contract that the
cow is pregnant. This would lead to severe inefficiency: A would use the cow for
meat and would derive a much lower value from the cow than would have been the
case had he been aware of the cow’s pregnancy. This could be one reason to prefer the
second solution (rescission but reliance damages) to the first one (no rescission) in
situations—represented by Example 5—where disallowing rescission even to a
negligent party would lead to the withholding of productive information from the
party who could use it.
C. A Note on Other Accidental Mistakes
Mutual mistakes are not the only kind of accidental mistakes. There are also
unilateral mistake cases where one party failed to disclose information that he should
have disclosed, and one of the parties, or both, were the cheapest cost avoider of the
mistake. Thus, in Example 1 (Air and Noise Pollution), A should have informed B
about the pollution and noise emanating from the factory. Suppose, however, that
while A negligently failed to disclose this information to B, B also negligently failed
47

Art. 48, sec. 2.
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to ask about the noise and air quality or to indicate to A that he values clean air and
peace and quiet. Here, too, the non-disclosure is accidental, and the question of how
to allocate the risk could be answered by reference to the cheapest cost avoider
criterion.

Conclusion
The CESL regulates mistakes in a way that is not always consistent with
economic efficiency. Indeed, the Law’s formulation leaves enough leeway for courts
to incorporate efficiency considerations if they want to. Thus, while allowing the
mistaken party to rescind if the mistake was caused by the other party or when one
party knew, or was expected to know, of the other party’s mistake, the CESL adds
that “if the risk of the mistake was assumed, or in the circumstances should be borne,
by [the mistaken] party,” rescission should not be allowed. With respect to the latter
type of mistake cases, the CESL also alludes to “good faith and fair dealing” when it
defines the conditions for rescission. The “assumption of the risk” condition applies to
all mistakes, including mutual mistakes. Finally, for determining whether a duty of
disclosure arises in a given case, the CESL provides a long list of considerations for
courts to weigh, including the nature of the information and the costliness and relative
ease of acquiring it. All of the conditions for rescission can easily be given an
economic interpretation and enable courts to reach efficient outcomes.
Still the question that remains is why—assuming efficiency to be the goal—
use broad, ambiguous, and often unclear terms, instead of being more precise and
alluding explicitly to efficiency considerations of the type discussed in this Essay?
Incorporating “good faith and fair dealing” and similar terms just adds uncertainty,
which is particularly problematic for a law that is intended to apply to contractual
parties across different nations and cultures.
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